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Note 
Helsinn Healthcare S.A. v. Teva Pharmaceuticals 
USA, Inc.: “Sale” Keeps Its Old Meaning under 
the Leahy–Smith America Invents Act 
Sherrie Holdman* 
Petitioner Helsinn developed a new drug for treating cancer 
patients suffering from chemotherapy-induced nausea and 
vomiting.1 Before filing a patent application for the new drug, 
Helsinn entered into a license agreement and a supply and 
purchase agreement with MGI Pharma, Inc. (“MGI”).2 The 
agreements bound MGI to keep all the proprietary information 
confidential, including the novel formulations of the new drug.3 
As a public company, MGI filed a Form 8-K with the Securities 
and Exchange Commission (“SEC”) disclosing a redacted version 
of the agreements, omitting the details of the formulations.4 
Respondents Teva Pharmaceuticals USA, Inc. (“Teva”) filed an 
Abbreviated New Drug Application (“ANDA”) with the Food and 
Drug Administration (“FDA”), seeking to market generic 
versions of the same new drug.5 Teva challenged Helsinn’s 
patents as invalid or unenforceable.6 Following a bench trial, the 
United States District Court for the District of New Jersey found 
that Helsinn’s patents were valid and infringed.7 Teva appealed 
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 1. See Helsinn Healthcare S.A. v. Teva Pharm. USA, Inc., 855 F.3d 1356, 
1360 (Fed. Cir. 2017), aff’d, 139 S. Ct. 628 (2019). 
 2. Id. at 1361. 
 3. Id. 
 4. Id. 
 5. Id. at 1363. 
 6. Id. 
 7. See Helsinn Healthcare S.A. v. Dr. Reddy’s Laboratories Ltd., No. 11-
3962 (MLC), 2016 WL 832089, at *51–52 (D.N.J. Mar. 3, 2016) (holding that the 
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to the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit which then 
reversed and found that the agreements between Helsinn and 
MGI constituted a “sale” of the claimed invention prior to the 
“critical date,” rendering the patents invalid.8 The Supreme 
Court affirmed the Federal Circuit’s decision, holding that the 
Leahy-Smith America Invents Act (AIA) did not change the 
meaning of the term “on-sale” under the pre-AIA § 102(b).9 
The major issue presented to the Supreme Court was 
whether, under the AIA, the “sale” remains the old meaning 
under the pre-AIA § 102 where even a “secret sale” would be 
enough to bar inventors from filing patent applications of their 
inventions.10 In other words, did Helsinn forfeit its patent rights 
by entering into agreements with MGI even though the 
agreements prohibited MGI from disclosing the invention? The 
Supreme Court answered both questions in the affirmative.11 
This Comment will analyze the Supreme Court’s decision on 
Helsinn as to the “secret sale” under the AIA. Part I will briefly 
examine the judicial interpretation of on-sale bar under the pre-
AIA § 102(b) and the AIA § 102(a)(1). Part II will introduce the 
Federal Circuit’s holding, the Supreme Court’s oral hearing, and 
its decision in Helsinn. Part III will discuss the Supreme Court’s 
Helsinn decision and the prospects for future small business 
owners and patent attorneys. This Comment concludes that the 
Supreme Court is likely correct in its conclusion although it did 
not discuss certain aspects in its opinion, including statutory 
text interpretation, relevant legislative history, and the overall 
goal of implementation of the AIA; instead, its reasoning was 
solely based on the weight of the Federal Circuit and Supreme 
Court precedents. 
                                                        
post-AIA on-sale bar inquiry is not focused on the public disclosure of the 
existence of a sale or offer for sale, but on the public disclosure of the claimed 
invention made in a sale), rev’d sub nom. Helsinn Healthcare S.A. v. Teva 
Pharm. USA, Inc., 855 F.3d 1356 (Fed. Cir. 2017), aff’d, 139 S. Ct. 628 (2019). 
 8. See Helsinn Healthcare S.A., 855 F.3d, at 1370 (concluding that under 
the AIA, if the existence of a sale is made public, the details of the invention are 
not required to trigger the on-sale bar). 
 9. See Helsinn Healthcare S.A., 139 S. Ct. 628, 630 (2019). 
 10. See id. at 633 (affirming the circuit decision that “secret sales” can 
invalidate a patent under the on-sale bar to patentability). 
 11. Id. at 630. 
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I. HISTORY OF ON-SALE BAR IN PATENT LAW AND 
JUDICIAL INTERPRETATIONS 
The paramount authority for the patent right comes from 
the U.S. Constitution.12 Under Article I Section 8, the 
Constitution expressly vests Congress the power to “promote the 
progress of science and useful arts, by securing for limited times 
to . . . inventors the exclusive right to their 
respective . . . discoveries.”13 Congress authorizes issuing 
patents to inventors of new and useful inventions or 
improvements on inventions.14 However, the inventions have to 
meet numerous patentability requirements in exchange for their 
“exclusive right.”15 These requirements include patentable 
subject matter,16 utility,17 novelty18, non-obviousness,19 
enablement,20 written description requirement21, claim 
definiteness,22 and best mode.23 
                                                        
 12. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
 13. Id. 
 14. See 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2015) (“Whoever invents or discovers any new and 
useful process, machine, manufacturer, or composition of matter, or any new 
and useful improvement thereof, may obtain a patent therefor, subject to the 
conditions and requirements of this title.”). 
 15. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
 16. See 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2015) (intending the statutory subject matter to 
include “process, machine, manufacturer, or composition of matter, or any 
improvement thereof). See, e.g., Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 182 (1981) 
(“Congress intended statutory subject matter to ‘include anything under the sun 
that is made by man.’”). 
 17. See 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2015) (intending the inventions or improvements 
to be “useful”). 
 18. See 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2015) (intending the inventions or improvements 
to be “new”); see also 35 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2015). 
 19. See 35 U.S.C. § 103 (2015) (“A patent for a claimed invention may not 
be obtained, . . . if the differences between the claimed invention and the prior 
art are such that the claimed invention as a whole would have been obvious 
before the effective filing date of the claimed invention to a person having 
ordinary skill in the art to which the claimed invention pertains.”). 
 20. See 35 U.S.C. § 112(a) (2015) (requiring the specification to “enable any 
person skilled in the art to which it pertains” to make and use the same). 
 21. See id. (requiring the specification to contain a “written description of 
the invention). 
 22. See id (requiring the written description to be in “full, clear, concise, 
and exact terms”). 
 23. See id (requiring the specification to “set forth the best mode 
contemplated by the inventor or joint inventor of carrying out the invention). 
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A. ON-SALE BAR UNDER THE PRE-AIA § 102(B) 
The on-sale bar is a limitation on patentability under the 
novelty requirement. Under the statutory language of the pre-
AIA § 102(b), an inventor should be entitled to a patent if “the 
invention was patented or described in a printed publication in 
this or a foreign country or in public use or on sale in this 
country, more than one year prior to the date of the application 
for patent in the United States.”24 Under the pre-AIA § 102(b), 
the combination of the “on sale” bar to patentability and the one-
year grace period is “an attempt by Congress to balance the 
interests of the inventor with the interests of the public.”25 If an 
invention was commercially exploited more than one year before 
filing, the invention would become ineligible for a patent because 
otherwise concealing would be encouraged and the statutory 
patent term would be unjustly extended.26 Indeed, the primary 
policy of on-sale bar is “to prevent inventors from exploiting 
commercial value of their invention while deferring beginning of 
statutory patent term.”27 Other polices include “encouraging 
prompt and widespread disclosure of inventions to the public, 
discouraging the removal of inventions from the public domain 
when the public has come to rely on their ready availability, and 
giving inventors a reasonable period to discern potential value 
of invention.”28 
The Pfaff two-factor test was often used by courts to 
determine whether a “sale” existed under the pre-AIA § 102(b).29 
Specifically, 
the on-sale bar applies when two conditions are satisfied before the 
critical date. First, the product must be the subject of a commercial 
offer for sale . . . . Second, the invention must be ready for patenting. 
That condition may be satisfied in at least two ways: by proof of 
reduction to practice before the critical date; or by proof that prior to 
the critical date the inventor had prepared drawings or other 
                                                        
 24. 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) (2000), amended by Pub. L. No. 112-29, § 3(b)(1), (n), 
125 Stat. 285, 293 (2011). 
 25. Gould Inc. v. U.S., 579 F.2d 571, 580 (Ct. Cl. 1978). 
 26. See generally Monon Corp. v. Stoughton Trailers, Inc., 915 F. Supp. 13 
(N.D. Ill. 1996) (holding that commercialization of invention more than one year 
before the patent application invalidated the patent). 
 27. James River Corp. of Virginia v. Hallmark Cards, Inc., 915 F. Supp. 
968, 997 (E.D. Wis. 1996) (internal citation omitted). 
 28. Id. 
 29. See Helsinn Healthcare S.A., 2016 WL 832089, at *38. 
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descriptions of the invention that were sufficiently specific to enable a 
person skilled in the art to practice the invention.30 
Therefore, under the pre-AIA § 102(b), not only does the on-
sale bar prohibit a public commercial sale, it also bars a “secret” 
sale as long as it meets the two conditions in Pfaff. In other 
words, a prior sale could invalidate a patent regardless of 
whether it was kept secret or not.31 
B. ON-SALE BAR UNDER THE AIA § 102(A)(1) 
On September 16, 2011, Congress passed the AIA which was 
signed into law.32 The purpose of the AIA was “to ensure that the 
patent system in the 21st century reflects the constitutional 
imperative.”33 In promulgating the AIA, Congress focused their 
attention on the value of harmonizing the U.S. patent system 
with the best parts of other major patent systems in the 
industrialized world for the benefit of U.S. patent holders, 
improving patent quality and providing a more efficient system 
for challenging patents, and reducing unwarranted litigation 
costs.34 In addition, a House Report emphasized that the AIA 
was promulgated to maintain the United States’ competitive 
edge in the global economy.35 
Among other significant changes in the patent system made 
by the AIA, the on-sale bar provision under the pre-AIA § 102(b) 
has been changed to a new provision.36 Under the new 
§ 102(a)(1), one is not entitled to a patent if “the claimed 
invention was patented, described in a printed publication, or in 
public use, on sale, or otherwise available to the public before the 
effective filing date of the claimed invention.”37 The specific 
changes made in § 102(a)(1) as compared to the old pre-AIA 
§ 102(b) include: removing the phrase “in this country” 
limitations as applied to “public use” and “on sale,” and adding 
                                                        
 30. Pfaff v. Wells Elecs., Inc., 525 U.S. 55, 67–68 (1998). 
 31. Id. 
 32. Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, 125 Stat. 285 
(2011). 
 33. H.R. REP. NO. 112-98, at 40 (2011). 
 34. See id. at 39–40 (discussing various arguments for changes to the 
patent law). 
 35. See id. at 40. (“If the United States is to maintain its competitive edge 
in the global economy, it needs a system that will support and reward all 
innovators with high quality patents.”). 
 36. See 35 U.S.C. § 102(a)(1) (2015) (amending 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) (2000)). 
 37. Id. 
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a catch-all phrase “available to the public.”38 The House Report 
also explained that the catch-all phrase is added “to clarify the 
broad scope of relevant prior art, as well as to emphasize the fact 
that it must be publicly accessible.”39 The United States Patent 
and Trademark Office (“USPTO”) interpreted the addition of the 
catch-all phrase as excluding secret sales and requiring public 
disclosure of the details of the claimed invention for the purpose 
of the on-sale bar.40 The Federal Circuit did not directly answer 
this question; instead it limited its Helsinn holding to the extent 
that “after the AIA, if the existence of the sale is public, the 
details of the invention need not be publicly disclosed in the 
terms of the sale.”41 The meaning of “sale” in the AIA § 102(a)(1) 
and its effect on triggering the on-sale bar under the AIA 
remained unclear until the recent Supreme Court’s Helsinn 
decision.42 
II. HELSINN HEALTHCARE S.A. V. TEVA PHARM. USA, 
INC. 
A. THE AGREEMENTS MADE BEFORE THE CRITICAL DATE AND 
THE HATCH-WAXMAN LITIGATION KEPT HELSINN’S INVENTION 
CONFIDENTIAL FROM THE PUBLIC 
Helsinn was the owner of the four patents-in-suit related to 
intravenous formulations of palonosetron for treating cancer 
patients with chemotherapy-induced nausea and vomiting.43 
Almost two years before applying for a patent, Helsinn entered 
                                                        
 38. See id.; H.R. REP. NO. 112-98, at 43 (2011) (removing the geographic 
limitations of prior art). 
 39. Id. 
 40. MANUAL OF PATENT EXAMINING PROCEDURE § 2152.02(d) (9th ed. 
2018) (“The pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. 102(b) ‘on sale’ provision has been interpreted as 
including commercial activity even if the activity is secret . . . . AIA 35 U.S.C. 
102(a)(1) uses the same ‘on sale’ term as pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. 102(b). The ‘or 
otherwise available to the public’ residual clause of AIA 35 U.S.C. 102(a)(1), 
however, indicates that AIA 35 U.S.C. 102(a)(1) does not cover secret sales or 
offers for sale. For example, an activity (such as a sale, offer for sale, or other 
commercial activity) is secret (non-public) if it is among individuals having an 
obligation of confidentiality to the inventor.”). 
 41. Helsinn Healthcare S.A., 855 F.3d at 1371. 1 
 42. See generally Helsinn Healthcare S.A., 139 S. Ct. at 630 (“The addition 
of the catchall phrase ‘or otherwise available to the public’ is not enough of a 
change for the Court to conclude that Congress intended to alter the meaning 
of ‘on sale’.”). 
 43. Helsinn Healthcare S.A., 855 F.3d at 1359–60. 
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into two agreements with MGI, an oncology-focused 
pharmaceutical company.44 These two agreements constitute a 
license agreement and a supply and purchase agreement.45 
While the agreements were announced in a joint press release of 
the two corporations and redacted copies of both agreements 
were filed by MGI with the SEC, nothing regarding the specific 
inventions was disclosed to the public.46 According to the supply 
and purchase agreement, MGI agreed to purchase exclusively 
from Helsinn, and Helsinn agreed to supply MGI’s requirements 
of the invented products, if approved by the FDA.47 The price, 
method of payment, and method of delivery were all specified in 
the supply and purchase agreement.48 The license agreement 
further stated that, if in the event that the FDA denied the sale 
of the product, Helsinn could terminate the license agreement, 
and if the license agreement were terminated, the supply and 
purchase agreement would “terminate automatically.”49 
After signing of the agreements, but before the critical date, 
Helsinn continued its Phase III trial and filed its New Drug 
Application in September 2002.50 On January 30, 2003, Helsinn 
filed a provisional patent application directed to its invention 
products, and other related patent applications subsequently.51 
All patents were listed in the FDA’s “Orange Book.”52 
Teva filed an ANDA seeking FDA approval to market a 
generic product of Helsinn’s patented new drugs in 2011.53 A 
“Paragraph IV” certification was included in the ANDA filing, 
asserting that the patents-in-suit were invalid and/or not 
infringed.54 Hence, Helsinn brought a suit under the Hatch-
Waxman Act, 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(2)(A).55 
After a bench trial, the district court found, among other 
things, that the AIA changed the meaning of the on-sale bar and 
                                                        
 44. Id. at 1361. 
 45. Id. 
 46. Id. 
 47. Id. 
 48. Id. at 1362. 
 49. Id. 
 50. Id. 
 51. Id. 
 52. Id. 
 53. Id. at 1363. 
 54. Id. 
 55. Id. 
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the AIA § 102(a)(1) now “requires a public sale or offer for sale 
of the claimed invention.”56 That is, under the AIA, a sale could 
trigger the on-sale bar only when the details of the invention 
were disclosed publicly.57 
B. THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT REVERSED AND HELD THAT A SECRET 
SALE CONSTITUTES PRIOR ART UNDER THE AIA 
Teva appealed to the Court of Appeals of the Federal 
Circuit. On May 1, 2017, the Federal Circuit decided that an 
invention was made available to the public and thus triggered 
the bar when there was a commercial offer or contract to sell a 
product embodying the invention and that sale was made public, 
regardless whether the details of the invention were disclosed in 
the terms of sale or not.58 There should be no need for the public 
to be aware of the subject matter of the invention from a sale 
disclosure to trigger the on-sale bar under the AIA; a disclosure 
of the existence of the transaction would suffice. 
The Federal Circuit started its reasoning by citing to an 
earlier case law, In re Caveney.59 The court stated that following 
In re Caveney, “sales or offers by one person of a claimed 
invention . . . bar another party from obtaining a patent if the 
sale or offer to sell is made over a year before the latter’s filing 
date.”60 The court refused to interpret the floor statements as 
related to anything more than the sale’s accompanying public 
uses.61 Finally, the court rejected Helsinn’s interpretation of the 
phrase “otherwise available to the public” to exclude a secret sale 
under the AIA by explaining that such a reading “would work a 
foundational change in the theory of the statutory on-sale bar.”62 
                                                        
 56. Id. 
 57. See id. (finding that “the MGI Supply and Purchase Agreement did not 
constitute a public sale or commercial offer for sale because, although it 
disclosed the sale agreement and substance of the transaction, it failed to 
publicly disclose the 0.25 mg dose.”). 
 58. Id. at 1370–71. 
 59. Id. at 1367–68 (citing to In re Caveney, 761 F.2d 671 (Fed. Cir. 1985)). 
 60. See id. (citing In re Caveney, 761 F.2d at 675). 
 61. See id. at 1368. The Federal Circuit declined to interpret the floor 
statements as to on-sale bar generally, but held that “[a]t most the floor 
statements show an intent ‘to do away with precedent under current § 102 law” 
and the precedent was referred to “certain secret uses to be invalidating under 
the ‘public use’ prong of § 102(b).” Id. 
 62. See id. at 1369. 
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Citing to numerous earlier cases, 63 the court concluded that 
since the earlier cases encompassed the application of the on-
sale bar to secret sales based on policy reasons stated in 
Pennock,64 the Congress would not have considered to overturn 
all the precedents with the addition of the phrase “otherwise 
available to public” under the AIA.65 
C. THE SUPREME COURT GRANTED CERTIORARI TO ADDRESS THE 
ON-SALE BAR DISPUTE UNDER THE AIA AND HEARD THE CASE 
ON DECEMBER 4, 2018 
On February 28, 2018, Helsinn filed the Petition for a Writ 
of Certiorari to the U.S. Supreme Court.66 On June 25, 2018, the 
Supreme Court granted the petition.67 
According to Helsinn’s brief filed on August 23, 2018, the 
presented question was directed to whether a secret sale 
triggered the on-sale bar under the AIA.68 Helsinn focused on 
                                                        
 63. See id. at 1369–71. The Federal Circuit cited Pennock v. Dialogue, 27 
U.S. (2 Pet.) 1, 19, 7 L. Ed. 327 (1829), which held that a secret sale “would 
materially retard the progress of science and useful arts, and give a premium 
to those who should be least prompt to communicate their discoveries.” The 
court further cited RCA Corp. v. Data Gen. Corp., 887 F.2d 1056, 1060 (Fed. Cir. 
1989), stating that the prior cases explicitly rejected a requirement to publicly 
disclose the details of the invention in the terms of sale to trigger the on-sale 
bar. Further, the court cited Abbott Laboratories v. Geneva Pharmaceuticals, 
Inc., 182 F.3d 1315, 1317–18 (Fed. Cir. 1999), explaining that there was no 
requirement for the public to know that the product sold was the invention. 
 64. See Helsinn Healthcare S.A., 855 F.3d at 1369. In Pennock, the 
Supreme Court explained that a sale of an invented product while withholding 
the invention from the public should be invalidated because failing to do so 
“would materially retard the progress of science and useful arts, and give a 
premium to those who should be least prompt to communicate their 
discoveries.” Pennock, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 1, 19, 7 L. Ed. 327. 
 65. See Helsinn Healthcare S.A., 855 F.3d at 1371 (“Thus, our prior cases 
have applied the on-sale bar even when there is no delivery, when delivery is 
set after the critical date, or, even when, upon delivery, members of the public 
could not ascertain the claimed invention. There is no indication in the floor 
statements that these members intended to overrule these cases . . . ” and “[i]f 
Congress intended to work such a sweeping change to our on-sale bar 
jurisprudence and wished to repeal . . . [these prior] cases legislatively, it would 
do so by clear language.”). 
 66. Helsinn Healthcare S.A. v. Teva Pharm. USA, Inc., 855 F.3d 1356 (Fed. 
Cir. 2017), petition for cert. filed, 86 U.S.L.W. 3635 (U.S. Feb. 28, 2018) (No. 17-
1229). 
 67. Helsinn Healthcare S.A. v. Teva Pharm. USA, Inc., 138 S. Ct. 2678 
(Mem) (2018). 
 68. See Brief for Petitioner at (I), Helsinn Healthcare S.A. v. Teva Pharm. 
USA, Inc., 139 S. Ct. 628 (2019) (No. 17-1229), 2018 WL 4043179, at *I. 
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three arguments: the catch-all phrase,69 the legislative history, 
and the USPTO’s embraced interpretation.70 The statutory 
interpretation was the major focus in Helsinn’s argument. 
Helsinn read the AIA § 102(a)(1) as a provision enumerating two 
categories of patent-defeating prior art followed by a third 
category, which in turn set out three additional ways of putting 
an invention into the public domain, with two enumerated 
subcategories followed by a catch-all subcategory.71 In other 
words, Helsinn argued that Congress intended to link the catch-
all phrase to the preceding terms.72 Helsinn further explained 
that under the noscitur a sociis canon, the term “on-sale” should 
be interpreted based on the terms surrounding it and here every 
subcategory, including the two patent-related subcategories and 
the immediate preceding subcategory (“in public use”), meant 
public availability.73 Under such interpretation, “a sale qualifies 
as patent-defeating prior art only if it makes the claimed 
invention ‘available to the public.’”74 
Numerous special interest groups submitted amicus briefs 
for Helsinn about the same time, including Congressman Lamar 
Smith, who is one of the lead sponsors of the AIA.75 Congressman 
Smith’s brief explained and argued that the term “publicly 
disclosed” in § 102(b)(1)(B) and the term “disclosed” in 
§ 102(a)(1) can be regarded as “perfect synonyms,” and as a 
result the use of “disclosed” and “publicly disclosed” in the same 
section did not render “publicly disclosed” superfluous.76 It 
                                                        
(“Whether, under the Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, an inventor’s sale of 
an invention to a third party that is obligated to keep the invention confidential 
qualifies as prior art for purposes of determining the patentability of the 
invention.”). 
 69. See id. at 4 (“The new catch-all provision informs the meaning of the 
language that precedes it, clarifying that a sale qualifies as prior art only if the 
sale makes the claimed invention ‘available to the public.’”). 
 70. See id. 
 71. See id. at 14. 
 72. See id. at 15. 
 73. See id. 
 74. See id. 
 75. See, e.g., Brief for Congressman Lamar Smith as Amicus Curiae 
Supporting Petitioner, Helsinn Healthcare S.A. v. Teva Pharm. USA, Inc., 139 
S. Ct. 628 (2019) (No. 17-1229), 2018 WL 4043325. 
 76. See id. at 26–28. The Amicus Brief pointed out that the term “disclosed” 
imposed a drafting challenge to Congress because the term “disclosed” is used 
in the AIA as a generic term, which would cover both disclosures under 
§ 102(a)(1) and § 102(a)(2). Id. at 27. Using “disclosure” would make a patent-
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further argued that the mere repetition of the term “on sale” 
from the pre-AIA § 102(b) was not a sufficient basis for 
overriding the new statutory context and the old term must be 
construed in its new statutory context.77 Additionally, it pointed 
out that the policy concerns by the Federal Circuit were not 
necessary under the AIA.78 
The Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers of 
America (PhRMA) also submitted an amicus brief for Helsinn.79 
The PhRMA, representing the country’s leading innovative 
biopharmaceutical research companies, expressed its concerns 
about the impact of the Helsinn decision on innovation drugs 
given that every new drug in the U.S. has to be approved by 
FDA.80 The brief distinguished Helsinn’s situation from the old 
                                                        
filing disclosure under § 102(a)(2) trigger the start of the “grace period,” which 
it should not. Id. Adding the term “publicly” before “disclosure” helps Congress 
solve the problem: “the use of the term publicly disclosed in § 102(b)(1)(B) 
removed the possibility that its prior art exclusion would apply, for example, to 
the situation where the inventor had made a non-public disclosure in a 
provisional patent application that later was abandoned and had never become 
public.” Id. at 27–28 (emphasis added). In other words, as the Brief explained, 
publicly disclosed is the “perfect synonym” for disclosed under § 102(a)(1). Id. 
at 28 (emphasis added). 
 77. See id. at 29–30 (“Finding that ‘on sale’ carries with it every old 
meaning, . . . makes no sense in the context of a new patent statute. . . .”) The 
Brief provided the example of the term “prior art,” arguing that although 
Congress reused the term “prior art,” the term did not retain all of its old 
meaning under the new Patent Act. Id. at 29. “Like the term ‘prior art,” the 
term ‘on sale’ must be construed in its new statutory context . . . .” Id. at 30. 
 78. See id. at 30–33 (“The entire purpose of the patent system is to 
encourage disclosure over secrecy . . . . A patent act fulfilling this primary 
purpose of the patent laws would provide inventors with a continuing incentive 
to disclose rather than maintain secrecy. This first-inventor-to-file system 
operates to this end in part because prior art is measured based on the effective 
filing date of the claimed invention . . . the ‘on sale’ bar that the Federal Circuit 
imposed on this first-inventor-to-file system simply negates the incentive for 
public disclosure.”). 
 79. Brief for Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers of America 
Supporting Petitioner, Helsinn Healthcare S.A. v. Teva Pharm. USA, Inc., 139 
S. Ct. 628 (2019) (No. 17-1229), 2018 WL 4179033. 
 80. See id. at 1 (“In view of the risky biopharmaceutical research and 
development process, which has a significant failure rate, and the substantial 
requirements of the FDA to demonstrate safety and efficacy of new products, 
those results are not obtained cheaply. Since 2000, PhRMA member companies 
have invested more than $600 billion in the search for new treatments and 
cures, including an estimated $71.4 billion in 2017 alone.”). 
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cases cited by Teva,81 and concluded that none of these cited 
cases suggested that the Supreme Court “affirmed the 
invalidation of a patent in which a prior sale kept confidential 
from the public some facet of the claimed invention.”82 
The United States, representing the interests of the USPTO 
and several other agencies of the federal government, submitted 
its amicus brief supporting Helsinn.83 In addition to the 
arguments that the statutory text and the legislative history 
supported Helsinn’s interpretation of the AIA § 102(a)(1), the 
brief also argued that the agreements between Helsinn and MGI 
did not make the invention “available to the public” because, for 
at least one reason, that an invention was “on sale” only when 
an invented product could be purchased by its expected ultimate 
customers.84 Cautioning that treating a distributor as “the 
public” would place small companies that require assistance at 
an unwarranted disadvantage, the brief proposed that 
“[p]reparatory steps within such a company would not trigger 
the on-sale bar until the product’s expected ultimate purchasers 
were actually able to buy it.”85 
Respondent Teva filed a brief on October 9, 2018. In Teva’s 
brief, two questions were presented: the first one was directed to 
the meaning of “on sale” under the AIA, and the second one was 
directed to whether the transaction in question nevertheless put 
the invention “on sale” under a new reading of “on sale.”86 Teva’s 
                                                        
 81. See id. at 9–12 (“None of these cases addresses whether a sale of the 
invention, the terms of which sale bind the parties to confidentiality, bars a 
subsequent patent to the invention.”). 
 82. Id. at 9. 
 83. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner, 
Helsinn Healthcare S.A. v. Teva Pharm. USA, Inc., 139 S. Ct. 628 (2019) (No. 
17-1229), 2018 WL 4179034. 
 84. See id. at 26 (responding to Teva’s suggestion that “even if an invention 
must be ‘available to the public’ in order for the on-sale bar to be triggered, that 
requirement is satisfied here in part because ‘MGI is a member of the public’”). 
 85. Id. at 28. The Brief further distinguished Pfaff, explaining that Texas 
Instruments in Pfaff was indeed the ultimate purchaser of the patented 
product, i.e., the sockets as discrete units of commerce, because Texas 
Instruments presumably intended to use the sockets to manufacture its own 
products. See id. at 29. 
 86. See Brief for Respondents at i, Helsinn Healthcare S.A. v. Teva Pharm. 
USA, Inc., 139 S. Ct. 628 (2019) (No. 17-1229) (“The questions presented 
are . . . [w]hether the 2011 amendment changed the meaning of ‘on sale’ so that 
commercial sales no longer start the grace period unless they also make the 
invention ‘available to the public’ [and]. . . [i]f the 2011 amendment changed the 
meaning of ‘on sale,’ whether petitioner nonetheless placed its invention ‘on 
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argument focused on the precedent reading of “on sale” under 
the pre-AIA § 102,87 the plain meaning of the term “on sale,”88 
the “clear language” canon,89 the sole purpose intended by the 
catch-all phrase,90 and the superfluous canon.91 Teva 
emphasized that if Congress indeed intended to change the well-
settled meaning of “on sale,” it would have acted expressly 
instead of vaguely.92 Teva argued that the term “on sale” was a 
“term of art” with a well-settled judicial interpretation, and the 
fact that Congress left the term intact in the new AIA suggested 
that it intended to keep the same meaning, especially when 
there are many alternative terms that Congress could have used 
if such a change was intended.93 In reply to Helsinn’s argument 
that the catch-all phrase changed the meaning of “on sale,” Teva 
argued that the Congress added the catch-all phrase for only one 
purpose: to cover prior art that would not be qualified under the 
pre-AIA § 102, such as oral presentations.94 
Many groups also submitted amicus briefs for Respondent, 
including Congresswoman Zoe Lofgren,95 who argued that the 
text “on sale” meant when it was offered for sale and that such 
                                                        
sale’ when it sold the invention for $11 million and disclosed every element of 
the invention to the buyer.”). 
 87. See id. at 18 (“[T]his Court has long held – from Pennock through Pfaff 
– that a sale or offer for sale to even one buyer, . . .triggers the on-sale bar 
regardless of what is disclosed to the public.”). 
 88. See id. (relying on the dictionary meaning of “on sale”). 
 89. See id. (“Had Congress intended to change the ordinary and settled 
meaning of ‘on sale,’ it would have done so directly and expressly.”). 
 90. See id. at 19 (arguing that the catch-all phrase was added for only one 
purpose to cover oral presentation and that the term “otherwise” does not mean 
that everything previously covered would fall into the catch-all). 
 91. See id. at 20 (explaining that the use of “disclosure” and “public 
disclosure” at the same time in Section 102 further evidenced that the “on sale” 
needs not to be “public”). 
 92. See id. at 26. (“But assertions that Congress changed the Court’s settled 
interpretation of statutory language must clear a high bar, especially when 
based on changes to nearby statutory language rather than the operative text.”). 
 93. See id. at 28 (“Had Congress meant to change its established meaning 
as Helsinn suggests, it had several obvious ways to do so that would have 
tracked the surrounding bars (“patented,” “described in a printed publication,” 
or in “public use”).). 
 94. See id. at 30; see supra note 90 and its accompanying text. 
 95. See generally Brief for Congresswoman Zoe Lofgen as Amicus Curiae 
Supporting Respondent, Helsinn Healthcare S.A. v. Teva Pharm. USA, Inc., 139 
S. Ct. 628 (2019) (No. 17-1229). 
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interpretation was supported by precedents,96 and the phrase “or 
otherwise available to the public” was to broaden but not to 
restrict the range of conduct.97 The brief further questioned the 
reliability of the legislative history provided by Helsinn,98 
arguing that Congress explicitly rejected proposals that would 
have a sweeping change to the on-sale bar,99 and purposely 
preserved the old terms under the new AIA.100 
Additionally, a group called “Forty-Five Intellectual 
Property Professors” also submitted its amicus brief,101 arguing 
that, as to the legislative history, the fact that Congress adopted 
the same terms: “public use” and “on sale”, in the new AIA 
instead of eliminating both from the new statute suggested 
Congress did not intend to remove secret sales from prior art.102 
It further noted that, as also noted by Congresswoman Lofgren, 
the legislative history provided by Helsinn was not reliable 
because it was a colloquy, or individual senator statement, but 
not the Committee as a whole.103 The Brief further stressed that 
Helsinn’s interpretation of the AIA § 102(a)(1) would “radically 
                                                        
 96. See id. at 3–4 (“Though old, these cases are hardly relics, as their 
holdings have continued to be applied in more recent decisions.”). 
 97. See id. at 7–8 (“Congress added the phrase ‘or otherwise available to 
the public’ to broaden the range of conduct that could invalidate a patent, not 
to restrict it.”). 
 98. See id. at 10–11 (“The AIA’s legislative history provides no justification 
for departing from the plain language of the on-sale bar . . . . No one 
understands the legislative history behind reenacting the on-sale bar better 
than Rep. Lofgren, who championed retaining the ‘on-sale’ language that 
ultimately remained in the AIA against vocal opposition in Congress.”). 
 99. See id. at 11–12 (“Congress was aware of concrete proposals that would 
have enacted just such a sweeping change. Yet Congress did not adopt these 
proposals.”). 
 100. See id. at 12–14 (“Instead of adopting language that would have 
replaced the on-sale bar with a publicity-based standard, Congress preserved 
the on-sale bar in the AIA. . . .”). 
 101. Brief for 45 Intellectual Property Professors as Amicus Curiae 
Supporting Respondent, Helsinn Healthcare S.A. v. Teva Pharm. USA, Inc., 139 
S. Ct. 628 (2019) (No. 17-1229), 2018 WL 4941710. 
 102. See id. at 7–8 (“The history of the drafting of the AIA suggests that it 
did not intend to narrow the universe of prior art to exclude commercial uses 
and sales that were not disclosed to the public.”. 
 103. See id. at 9–10 (arguing that the “official reports written by the 
Committee that advanced the legislation to the floor” is a stronger form of 
legislative history than a “colloquy”); see also Brief for Congresswoman Zoe 
Lofgen as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondent, supra note 95. 
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rewrite the law of prior art.”104 The Brief cautioned that the 
“very old and very much relied-upon body of law” should not be 
changed so radically with an ambiguous phrase in the new 
statute, and it was “highly unlikely” Congress intended such 
change.105 
On November 8, 2018, Helsinn filed a reply.106 After 
reminding the Supreme Court that the AIA “worked a sea 
change in American patent law,”107 the reply went on to point 
out that the Teva failed to recognize the clear plain meaning of 
the catch-all term in § 102(a)(1),108 that Teva’s reliance on the 
doctrine of congressional ratification lacked merit,109 and that 
the “publicly disclose” language in § 102(b)(1) did not render the 
meaning of “disclose” in § 102(a)(1) superfluous.110 In addition, 
Helsinn argued that Teva failed to recognize the importance of 
the committee report in legislative history but to look at a 
“general recognition.”111 Finally, Helsinn argued that the plain-
                                                        
 104. See id. at 11 (“Petitioner’s reading . . . attributes a quite radical intent 
and effect to the new prior art provision in the AIA: it would sweep away scores 
of cases, accumulated over two centuries, defining in great detail each of the 
specific categories of prior art listed in AIA § 102(a). Opinions by giants in the 
patent field, from Joseph Story to Learned Hand to Giles Rich – gone, by virtue 
of one added word in the new statute.”). 
 105. Id. 
 106. Reply Brief for Petitioner, Helsinn Healthcare S.A. v. Teva Pharm. 
USA, Inc., 139 S. Ct. 628 (2019) (No. 17-1229), 2018 WL 5876912. 
 107. Id. at 1. 
 108. See id. at 2–7 (arguing that the “otherwise” has been interpreted as a 
catch-all term modifying the precedent terms consistently by the Supreme 
Court and that Teva misunderstood the structure of the statute). 
 109. See id. at 8–12 (explaining that “[t]he doctrine of congressional 
ratification has two elements: (1) Congress must ‘reenact the relevant statutory 
language without change,’ and (2) the ‘supposed judicial consensus must be so 
broad and unquestioned that the Court must presume Congress knew of and 
endorsed it.’ (citation omitted). Respondents cannot satisfy either element.”). 
Most interestingly, Helsinn cited Pfaff to explain that the Court always stressed 
the critical “public domain.” Id. at 10 (citing to Pfaff in which the Court 
reiterated that the on-sale bar prevents an inventor from ‘removing existing 
knowledge from public use.’”). 
 110. See id. at 12–13. By criticizing Teva’s argument under the “superfluous” 
doctrine “both confusing and incorrect,” Helsinn once again explained in its 
Reply that the word “publicly” in § 102(b)(1)(B) clarifies that “the subject matter 
disclosed” falls within the ambit of the provision only if the earlier disclosure of 
the subject matter is itself public in order to avoid potential absurd results 
which are illustrated in the hypothetical examples given by Helsinn. Id. 
 111. See id. at 13 (“Respondents largely ignore the authoritative committee 
reports that manifest that [congressional] intention. Instead, they invoke a 
‘general recognition,’ pieced together from the drafting history of bills that 
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language interpretation served better the purposes of the AIA 
and the patent system.112 
On December 4, 2018, the Supreme Court heard the oral 
argument. The argument suggested that the court would resolve 
the problem from the perspective of statutory language.113 The 
parties focused mainly on two issues.114 The first issue was the 
function of the new language “otherwise available to the 
public.”115 That is, whether the phrase was intended to modify 
and clarify the preceding terms,116 or it was simply added to 
include items that were not covered by the pre-AIA § 102,117 or 
both.118 The second issue was the meaning of the term “on 
sale.”119 Petitioner Helsinn argued that “on sale” was 
distinguishable from “sale” because only a “sale” that was open 
to public can constitute an item “on sale.”120 Helsinn further 
argued that “on sale” would not apply when products were sold 
to distributors only.121 Majority of the Justices who spoke at the 
hearing seemed to take the position that the catch-all phrase 
was not intended to modify the preceding terms and the term “on 
sale” included both public and private sale.122 Chief Justice 
                                                        
Congress abandoned, that Congress did not intend to require that all prior-art 
sales make a claimed invention publicly available . . . .That is the epitome of 
‘entering a crowded cocktail party and looking over the heads of the guests for 
one’s friend.’”). Helsinn in its Reply reminded the Supreme Court that it has 
repeatedly noted that Committee reports are the most reliable source for 
legislative history. Id. at 15. 
 112. See id.18–20 (“[S]uch a requirement preserves the fundamental quid 
pro quo of patent law, promotes predictability in the patent system, and ensures 
that small inventors are on equal footing with their larger counterparts.”). 
 113. See Ronald Mann, Argument Analysis: Justices Debate Revised 
Language in Patent-Priority Statute, SCOTUSBLOG (Dec. 4, 2018, 7:50 PM), 
http://www.scotusblog.com/2018/12/argument-analysis-justices-debate-revised-
language-in-patent-priority-statute/. 
 114. See generally Oral Argument, Helsinn Healthcare S.A. v. Teva Pharm. 
USA, Inc., 139 S. Ct. 628 (2019) (No. 17-1229), 
https://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/argument_transcripts/2018/17-
1229_p702.pdf. 
 115. See generally id. 
 116. Id. at 26, ¶¶ 1–5. 
 117. Id. at 36, ¶¶ 5–13. 
 118. Id. at 13, ¶¶ 4–12. 
 119. See generally id. at 3–7. 
 120. Id. at 4, ¶¶ 11–16. 
 121. Id. at 22–24. 
 122. Id. Chief Justice Roberts noted that Helsinn’s interpretation that on 
sale requires public accessibility “might not be consistent with the actual 
meaning of the word ‘sale.’” Id. at 4, ¶¶ 2–4. Justice Kavanaugh questioned that 
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Roberts noted that the word “sale,” by its plain meaning, 
included both public and private sales.123 Newly appointed 
Justice Kavanaugh, in response to Helsinn’s hypothetical 
regarding a private sale, stated that “it’s pretty hard to say 
something that has been sold was not on sale.”124 Justice 
Ginsburg implied that the on-sale bar rule under the pre-AIA 
§ 102(b) was a well-settled one including secret sale, and further 
noted that Helsinn’s argument would have suggested that “on 
sale” never included the secret sale.125 While Helsinn replied 
that the AIA was intended to clarify the proper understanding 
of the phrase “on sale,” Justice Kavanaugh stated that such 
clarification was a “terrible” one.126 
As to the new language of the AIA § 102(a)(1), Helsinn 
argued that this new provision was intended to achieve two 
objectives: to expand the scope of prior art and also to restrict 
it.127 Helsinn further argued that the reason why Congress 
retained the terms “public use” and “on sale” was to abrogate the 
outlier cases involving the public use bar or on-sale bar where 
there was no public availability but retain the general 
jurisprudence concerning these terms.128 Justice Breyer 
expressed his concern about Helsinn’s argument that the 
Supreme Court had never ruled that the on-sale bar could be 
triggered without any public accessibility by citing Bonito 
Boats.129 However, Justice Breyer, recognizing the existence of 
                                                        
“[i]sn’t it always the case that if you offer it to even one person or to a small 
group of people, it’s on sale?” Id. at 5, ¶¶ 15–18. Justice Breyer noted that the 
precedent cases suggest that the on-sale rule includes private sales and its 
purpose is to prevent people from benefiting from their invention and extending 
the monopoly. Id. at 6, ¶¶ 14–24. 
 123. Id. at 4, ¶¶ 6–10. 
 124. Id. at 5, ¶¶ 1–2. 
 125. Id. at 11, ¶¶ 1–5. 
 126. Id. at ¶ 23. (“[I]f that was a clarification, it was a terrible clarification 
because there were a lot of efforts, as you well know, to actually change the ‘on 
sale’ language, and those all failed.”) 
 127. Id. at 13, ¶¶ 4–12. (“ . . . the catch-all provision . . . was to achieve two 
objectives: to make sure that they reached all forms of prior art, such as oral 
presentations, PowerPoint presentations, and the like, and also to clarify that 
any form of prior art must be publicly available.”). 
 128. See id. at 13 (“I do think that what Congress was doing was abrogating 
some of the outlying lower court decisions that had extended both the on-sale 
bar and the public use bar to cases where there was not public availability.”). 
 129. Id. at 17. Justice Breyer stated: “in Bonito Boats, this Court, while it 
isn’t necessary for the holding, does quote Learned Hand, and it does say it is a 
condition upon the inventor’s right to a patent that he shall not exploit his 
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“experimental exceptions” in patent law, proposed that the 
question at issue may be a question of what was on sale, and not 
what was public or private.130 Although Helsinn and Amicus 
United State argued that the law was not settled as to whether 
public availability must be required for triggering on-sale bar, 
Justice Kagan seemed to disagree and implied that Pfaff had 
already settled the issue.131 She further questioned Amicus 
United States whether the new AIA language was enough to 
unsettle the law which was presumed to be settled, and Amicus 
United States answered no.132 
Respondent Teva argued that the catch-all phrase was to 
create a new category of prior art that was not covered by the 
pre-AIA § 102 and that was the only purpose of the catch-all 
phrase.133 A few Justices seemed to disagree. In order to 
facilitate the understanding of the term “otherwise,” Justice 
Breyer provided a hypothetical string of “basketball, running, 
swimming, or otherwise, or games that otherwise involve a ball” 
and “Fiber One bran flakes, fruit, tea, and food that otherwise 
is . . . fiber heavy” and suggested that the use of “otherwise” in 
those examples was “awkward.”134 Justice Kagan provided a 
“brownie” hypothetical and implied that, with the “otherwise 
contains nuts” phrase, nut-less brownie should be okay to buy, 
and maybe by analogy the secret sales (like nut-less brownie 
which was excluded by the qualifying “otherwise” phrase) should 
not be a prior art under the new AIA § 102(a)(1) language.135 
                                                        
discovery competitively after it is ready for patenting. He has to go ahead and 
patent it or keep it a secret forever . . . That seemed to me the clear – pretty 
clear rationale of Learned Hand, of why the Court did that in Bonito Boats, of 
why Justice Story said what he said, and I think it’s that the Lemley brief was 
relying upon when they made that statement.” 
 130. Id. at 18, ¶¶ 15–19, 20–24. 
 131. Id. 25–26. 
 132. Id. at 28. 
 133. Id. 35–37. Teva explained that examples included in the new category 
are “oral presentation at a conference without slides,” “PowerPoint slides that 
get distributed,” “a collaboration app which is not on the Internet and is not 
indexed and would not count as a printed publication but ought to be the kind 
of disclosure.” Id. at 37. Teva further argued that the new category’s primary 
function was to create new invalidating prior art disclosures that were not 
invalidating under pre-AIA (i.e., expanding the scope of prior art), but it would 
be “strange” for Congress, at the same time, narrowing the scope of prior art by 
“the strangest implication.” Id. 
 134. Id. at 41–42. 
 135. Id.at 43–45. 
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Finally, Justice Kagan questioned whether third-party secret 
sales would trigger on-sale bar, and Teva answered yes.136 
D. THE SUPREME COURT AFFIRMED FEDERAL CIRCUIT’S 
DECISION 
On January 22, 2019, less than two months after the oral 
hearing, the Supreme Court unanimously affirmed the Federal 
Circuit’s decision and Justice Thomas delivered the Supreme 
Court’s opinion.137 Justice Thomas cited Pfaff at the beginning 
of the opinion, and stated the Pfaff two elements to determine 
the “on sale” under the pre-AIA § 102(b).138 He conceded that the 
precise question had never been addressed by the Supreme 
Court, but explained that the precedents suggested that there 
was no requirement of public availability to trigger the on-sale 
bar.139 Justice Thomas seemed to give great deference to the 
Federal Circuit and agreed that “secret sales” could constitute 
prior art under the on-sale bar.140 Based on both of the Supreme 
                                                        
 136. Id. at 57. 
 137. Helsinn Healthcare S.A. v. Teva Pharm. USA, Inc., supra. note 9. 
 138. Id. at 628. (“More than 20 years ago, this Court determined that an 
invention was ‘on sale’ within the meaning of an earlier version of § 102(a) when 
it was ‘the subject of a commercial offer for sale’ and ‘ready for patenting.’”) 
 139. Id. 633 
Although this Court has never addressed the precise question presented in this 
case, our precedents suggest that a sale or offer of sale need not make an 
invention available to the public. For instance, we held in Pfaff that an offer for 
sale could cause an inventor to lose the right to patent, without regard to 
whether the offer discloses each detail of the invention. 
Other cases focus on whether the invention had been sold, not whether the 
details of the invention had been made available to the public or whether the 
sale itself had been publicly disclosed. See e.g., Consolidated Fruit-Jar Co. v. 
Wright, 94 U.S. 92, 94 (1877) (“[A] single instance of sale or of use by the 
patentee may, under the circumstances, be fatal to the patent . . . ”); cf. Smith 
& Griggs Mfg. Co. v. Sprague, 123 U.S. 249, 257 (1887) (“A single sale to 
another . . . would certainly have defeated his right to a patent . . . ” ); Elizabeth 
v. Pavement Co., 97 U.S. 126, 136 (1878) (“It is not a public knowledge of his 
invention that precludes the inventor from obtaining a patent for it, but a public 
use or sale of it.”). 
 140. Id.Justice Thomas emphasized that the Federal Circuit “has ‘exclusive 
jurisdiction’ over patent appeals” and “has made explicit what was implicit in 
our precedents.” Justice Thomas further explained that the Federal Circuit “has 
long held that ‘secret sales’ can invalidate a patent. E.g., Special Devices, Inc. v. 
OEA, Inc., 270 F.3d 1353, 1357 (2001) (invalidating patent claims based on 
‘sales for the purpose of the commercial stockpiling of an invention’ that ‘took 
place in secret”).” Id. See Woodland Trust v. Flowertree Nursery, Inc., 148 F. 3d 
1368, 1370 (1998) (“Thus an inventor’s own prior commercial use, albeit kept 
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Court and the Federal Circuit precedents, Justice Thomas 
concluded that the meaning of “on sale” was settled in the 
context of the pre-AIA § 102 and Congress adopted the same 
judicial construction of that phrase when reenacting the same 
language in the AIA.141 Justice Thomas further noted that, 
“adding the phrase ‘or otherwise available to the public’ to the 
statute ‘would be a fairly oblique way of attempting to overturn’ 
that ‘settled body of law.’”142 As to the statutory interpretation 
of the catch-all phrase, Justice Thomas disagreed with Helsinn 
and concluded that the catch-all phrase was “simply not enough” 
to make such a significant change of a term whose meaning has 
already been well settled.143 Thus, the Court adopted Teva’s 
interpretation that the catch-all phrase was only intended to 
include qualified prior art that had not been covered by the pre-
AIA § 102 such as oral presentations.144 
III. ANALYSIS 
A. THE SUPREME COURT LIKELY REACHED THE CORRECT 
CONCLUSION ALTHOUGH IT FAILED TO DISCUSS SEVERAL 
CRITICAL ASPECTS. 
The Supreme Court’s affirmation of the Federal Circuit’s 
holding is likely correct. The AIA § 102(a)(1) would not require 
the details of the invention to be made publicly available to 
trigger the on-sale bar. However, it seems that the Supreme 
                                                        
secret, may constitute a public use or sale under §102(b), barring him from 
obtaining a patent.”). 
 141. Helsinn Healthcare S.A., 139 S.Ct. at 633–34. (“In light of this settled 
pre-AIA precedent on the meaning of ‘on-sale,’ we presume that when Congress 
reenacted the same language in the AIA, it adopted the earlier judicial 
construction of that phrase.”); see Shapiro v. United States, 335 U.S. 1, 16 (1948) 
(“In adopting the language used in the earlier act, Congress ‘must be considered 
to have adopted also the construction given by this Court to such language, and 
made it a part of the enactment.’”). 
 142. Id. 634. 
 143. Id. at 634 
As an initial matter, neither of the cited decisions addresses the reenactment of 
terms that had acquired a well-settled judicial interpretation. And Helsinn’s 
argument places too much weight on §102’s catch-all phrase. Like other such 
phrases, ‘otherwise available to the public’ captures material that does not fit 
neatly into the statute’s enumerated categories but is nevertheless meant to be 
covered. Given that the phrase ‘on sale’ had acquired a well-settled meaning 
when the AIA was enacted, we decline to read the addition of a broad catch-all 
phrase to upset that body of precedent. 
 144. Id. 
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Court focused only on the weight of the precedents but failed to 
discuss many relevant aspects in its decision. These relevant 
aspects include the plain meaning of the statutory language of § 
102(a)(1), the legislative history of § 102(a)(1), and the 
underlying polices of the AIA. In fact, it is doubtful that whether 
the Supreme Court relying on the Federal Circuit’s precedents 
is merely a convenient way to achieve the end they prefer.145 It 
is said that the Supreme Court’s opinion was written so 
succinctly to carefully “avoid saying anything that might upset 
any apple carts unnecessarily.”146 Nevertheless, considering the 
inherent ambiguity of the statutory text in § 102(a)(1) and the 
potential “sweeping change” on the scope of prior art which was 
established for 200 years, the Supreme Court likely reached the 
correct decision. 
i. Like the Federal Circuit’s Opinion, the Supreme Court’s 
Opinion Contains Minimal Discussion of Statutory 
Interpretation. 
In its opinion, the Federal Circuit did not apply the plain 
meaning rule in its statutory interpretation. In fact, the Federal 
Circuit did not discuss the impact of the catch-all phrase 
“otherwise available to the public” on the interpretation of the 
AIA § 102(a)(1) at all. It merely cited the precedents and 
concluded that it would be impossible for Congress to 
promulgate such a “sweeping change” rule.147 Similarly, the 
Supreme Court did not discuss too much about the plain 
meaning of the catch-all phrase but instead emphasized that the 
meaning of the “on sale” was a settled law which should not be 
upset by the catch-all phrase in the new statute.148 
                                                        
 145. See generally Gene Quinn, Supreme Court Decides Helsinn v. Teva, 
Secret Sale Qualifies as Prior Art Under the AIA, IPWATCHDOG (Jan. 22, 2019), 
http://www.ipwatchdog.com/2019/01/22/helsinn-v-teva-secret-sale-prior-art-
aia/id=105492/. 
 146. See Ronald Mann, Opinion Analysis: Justices Affirm Ruling that Secret 
Sales of Invention Bar Later Patent, SCOTUSBLOG (Jan. 22, 2019, 4:37 PM), 
https://www.scotusblog.com/2019/01/opinion-analysis-justices-affirm-ruling-
that-secret-sales-of-invention-bar-later-patent/. 
 147. See Helsinn Healthcare S.A. v. Teva Pharm. USA, Inc. supra note 1, at 
1371. 
 148. Helsinn Healthcare S.A. v. Teva Pharm. USA, Inc., supra note 9, at 634. 
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In statutory interpretation, the language itself is the first 
thing to examine.149 “Where the language is plain and admits of 
no more than one meaning the duty of interpretation does not 
arise.”150 Further, “[i]n the absence of a specific indication to the 
contrary, words in the statutes will be given their common, 
ordinary and accepted meaning, and the plain language of the 
statute should be afforded its plain meaning.”151 The focus of the 
statutory interpretation of the AIA § 102(a)(1) is the meaning of 
the term “otherwise.” 
As mentioned earlier, under Helsinn’s reading, this term 
modifies all the preceding terms. However, as pointed out in one 
Amicus brief, the prominent and common definition of 
“otherwise” is in fact “different.”152 In other words, the 
“otherwise” phrase suggests a “different circumstances” of prior 
art besides the preceding ones.153 This reading is consistent with 
Teva’s position that the added phrase was intended to expand 
the covered prior art. However, as Helsinn pointed out during 
the Supreme Court oral hearing, the Court has a modifier to the 
preceding terms that share a specific characteristic.154 One 
example given by Helsinn comes from United States v. Standard 
Brewery.155 
At the hearing, the Supreme Court extensively questioned 
whether the catch-all phrase in the AIA “expanded or contracted 
the universe of prior art.”156 As mentioned earlier, many creative 
                                                        
 149. See Caminetti v. U.S., 242 U.S. 470, 485 (1917) (“ . . . the meaning of 
the statute must, in the first instance, be sought in the language in which the 
act is framed, and if that is plain, . . . the sole function of the courts is to enforce 
it according to its terms.”). 
 150. NORMAN SINGER, SUTHERLAND STATUTE AND STATUTORY 
CONSTRUCTION § 45:2 (7th ed. 2018). 
 151. See generally U.S. v. Lehman, 225 F.3d 426 (4th Cir. 2000). 
 152. Brief for SPCM S.A. and High Tech Inventors Alliance as Amicus 
Curiae Supporting Respondent at 24–25, Helsinn Healthcare S.A. v. Teva 
Pharmaceuticals USA Inc., 138 S. Ct. 2678 (2018) (No. 17-1229). 
 153. Id. 
 154. Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 114, at 58–59. 
 155. Id. In that case, the statute (i.e., the Wartime Prohibition Act) 
prohibited the use of grains to manufacture “beer, wine, or other intoxicating 
malt or vinous liquor for beverage purposes.” The Supreme held that the statute 
does not apply to non-intoxicating beer because the qualifying words “other 
intoxicating” modified the preceding words “beer” and “wine.” Other 
interpretation would render the qualifying words superfluous. United States v. 
Standard Brewery, Inc., 251 U.S. 210, 217, 218 (1920). 
 156. Dennis Crouch, Of Brownies and Other Nutty Desserts: Supreme Court 
Considers Whether the “On Sale” Bar Is Limited to Public Sales, PATENTLYO 
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hypotheticals were given during the hearing in order to 
understand what the term “otherwise” meant in statutes and in 
daily life, including Justice Kagan’s “brownie” hypothetical.157 In 
fact, when Justice Kagan proposed the “brownie” hypothetical to 
Teva, Teva “ha[d] the wrong answer,” according to Justice 
Kavanaugh,158 because Teva’s answer implied that, with the 
qualifying phrase “otherwise contains nuts,” buying nutless 
brownie was permissible. In other words, Teva seemed to agree 
that, at least in the hypothetical, the catch-all phrase indeed 
modified and limited the preceding terms when the preceding 
terms could have more than one meaning. 
However, Teva insisted that, both in its brief and during the 
oral hearing, that the function of the catch-all phrase was to 
create a new category of invalidating prior art, such as the oral 
presentation that had not been covered under the pre-AIA § 102, 
and the new category should have no impact on the preceding 
terms.159 Many Justices expressed concerns about Teva’s 
interpretation of the term “otherwise.” For example, Justice 
Breyer used the word “awkward”160 and Justice Alito used the 
word “nonsense”161 to describe the situation by using “otherwise” 
in proposed examples according to Teva’s interpretation. 
Nevertheless, both parties agreed that the catch-all phrase 
was added to at least cover the kind of prior art such as oral 
presentation which was not covered under the pre-AIA § 102.162 
Teva argued that this was the only purpose of the catchall 
phrase, but Helsinn disagreed and argued that the phrase had 
dual functions.163 The Supreme Court’s opinion suggested that 
it agreed with Teva.164 However, despite the extensive 
discussion of the catch-all phrase’s meaning and its effect on 
                                                        
(Dec. 4, 2018), https://patentlyo.com/patent/2018/12/brownies-desserts-
considers.html. 
 157. Transcript of Oral Argument 43–44, supra note 114. The hypothetical 
given by Justice Kagan during the oral hearing is: when one says don’t buy 
peanut butter cookies, pecan pie, brownies, or any dessert that otherwise 
contains nuts, does one violate the injunction if he/she buys nutless brownies? 
 158. Id. at 46. 
 159. Id. at 36. 
 160. Id. 41–42. 
 161. Id. at 33. 
 162. Id. at 56. 
 163. Id. at 12. 
 164. See Helsinn Healthcare S.A. v. Teva Pharm. USA, Inc., 139 S.Ct. 628, 
634 (2019). 
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precedent terms in the AIA § 102(a) during the oral hearing, the 
opinion contained minimal discussion but rather rushed to its 
conclusion that Helsinn placed too much weight on § 102’s catch-
all phrase and the weight of the well-settled law mattered the 
most.165 It seems that the Supreme Court at least conceded that 
an ordinary reading of the catch-all phrase would have changed 
the meaning of “on sale” in the AIA § 102(a)(1), but nevertheless 
concluded that the effect was not enough to overturn existing 
precedents.166 This reasoning is somewhat surprising 
considering the Supreme Court’s decisions in Myriad167 and 
Mayo,168 the Supreme Court showed no hesitation to change a 
“well-settled” law with numerous precedents.169 In contrast, 
here, while the Supreme Court considered the weight of the 
precedents, it simply avoided to consider the weight of the 
statutory interpretation of the catch-all phrase, which had at 
least two plausible interpretations.170 Instead, it reached its “not 
enough” conclusion without giving an explanation as how to 
balance the weight of the plain meaning of statutory text and the 
weight of judicial precedents.171 Although this opinion is likely 
correct, the Court should have at least discussed why Helsinn’s 
interpretation of the catch-all phrase cannot outweigh prior 
precedents, especially where, as here, a plain meaning of the 
catch-all phrase at least plausibly suggests a different meaning 
of “on sale” under the new AIA. This leaves little guidance to 
lower courts as to how to conduct a balancing analysis when 
facing a conflict between statutory text and related precedents. 
ii. The Supreme Court Did Not Discuss the Legislative History 
of the AIA 102(a)(1) in Its Opinion 
The Federal Circuit held that the cited legislative history 
was not reliable and even if the court took the legislative history 
into consideration, because the precedent was related to a 
                                                        
 165. See id. at 635. 
 166. See id. 
 167. See generally Ass’n. for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 
569 U.S. 576 (2013). 
 168. See generally Mayo Collaborative Services v. Prometheus Laboratories, 
Inc., 566 U.S. 66 (2012). 
 169. See Supreme Court Decides Helsinn v. Teva, Secret Sale Qualifies as 
Prior Art Under the AIA, supra. note 145. 
 170. Id. 
 171. See Helsinn Healthcare S.A. v. Teva Pharm. USA, Inc., 139 S.Ct. 628, 
635 (2019). 
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“public use” issue, it was not applicable to Helsinn because the 
issue here was about a “secret sale.”172 The Supreme Court 
seemed to agree. In the Supreme Court’s opinion, no discussion 
of legislative history could be found. At most, in determining the 
congressional intent, Justice Thomas merely cited Shapiro v. 
United States and concluded that it was presumed that Congress 
adopted the old meaning of “on sale” when the AIA was 
reenacted.173 This “presumption” seems un-rebuttable. Or, at 
least, one could assume that a plain meaning of the statute 
coupled with legislative history materials that could support 
such reading cannot rebut that presumption. 
In A Guide to the Legislative History of the America Invents 
Act: Part I of II, Joe Matal observed that Senator Leahy and 
Hatch stated that new §102(a) limited prior art to the ones that 
made the invention available to the public; that private offers for 
sale or private uses or secret processes would no longer be prior 
art; and that the public-availability standard was defined in 
terms of the Federal Circuit’s public-accessibility 
jurisprudence.174 Joe Matal pointed out that two passages of the 
Leahy-Hatch colloquy were particularly relevant to the new 
§ 102(a) and both suggested that the prior art under new 
§ 102(a) must meet the public-availability standard.175 The 
catch-all phrase was first adopted in July 2007 during the 
                                                        
 172. Helsinn Healthcare S.A. v. Teva Pharm. USA, Inc., 855 F.3d 1356, 1368 
(Fed. Cir. 2017), cert. granted, 138 S. Ct. 2678 (2018). 
 173. Helsinn Healthcare S.A.,139 S.Ct. at 634. 
 174. See Joe Matal, A Guide to the Legislative History of the America Invents 
Act: Part I of II, 21 FED. CIR. BAR J. 435, 467 (2012). 
 175. Id. 467–68 (citing 157 CONG. REC. S1496 (daily ed. Mar. 9, 2011). 
Statement of Senator Hatch: “the important point is that if an inventor’s 
disclosure triggers the 102(a) bar with respect to an invention, which can only 
be done by a disclosure that is both made available to the public and 
enabled . . . If a disclosure resulting from the inventor’s actions is not one that 
is enabled, or is not made available to the public, then such a disclosure would 
not constitute patent-defeating prior art under 102(a) in the first place.” Id. at 
467. Statement of Senator Leahy: “[o]ne of the implications of the point we are 
making is that subsection 102(a) was drafted in part to do away with precedent 
under current law that private offers for sale or private uses or secret processes 
practiced in the United States that result in a product or service that is then 
made public may be deemed patent-defeating prior art. That will no longer be 
the case. In effect, the new paragraph 102(a)(1) imposes an overarching 
requirement for availability to the public, that is a public disclosure, which will 
limit paragraph 102(a)(1) prior art to subject matter meeting the public 
accessibility standard that is well-settled in current law, especially case law of 
the Federal Circuit.”Id. at 467–68. 
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Senate Judiciary Committee’s markup of a predecessor bill.176 In 
the 2007 Senate Committee Report, § 102(a)(1)’s new definition 
of “prior art” was commented on in two places: the Report’s 
legislative history section177 and the background section,178 and 
both suggested that public availability was a requisite for 
constituting a § 102(a)(1) prior art. Again on September 6, 2011, 
Senator Kyl readdressed the bill’s definition of “prior art” as the 
Senate considered the House-passed bill and pointed out that 
under new § 102(a), a sale or offer for sale could constitute prior 
art only if the sale or the offer makes the invention publicly 
accessible, and the new definition of “prior art” would 
substantially reduce litigation discovery costs.179 Joe Matal 
further pointed out that the new definition of “prior art” was also 
reflected in other parts of the AIA itself.180 
In the final Committee Report for the AIA which was issued 
on June 1, 2011, Senator Kyl’s March 8 remarks as to his 
statements on new § 102(a) were included, including, among 
other things, “(3) stated that the use of the word ‘otherwise’ in 
the final clause ‘makes clear that the preceding clauses describe 
things that are of the same quality or nature as the final clause;” 
“(4) discussed three cases—Strom v. Goldman, Sachs & Co.; 
                                                        
 176. See id. at 470. 
 177. Id. at 471 (citing S. REP. NO. 110-259, at 39 (2008) (“This Managers’ 
Amendment also added the phrase ‘otherwise available to the public’ to § 102 to 
make clear that secret collaborative agreements, which are not available to the 
public, are not prior art.”). 
 178. Id. at 472 (citing S. REP. NO. 110-259, at 9). Matel also notes that 
section 2 of the bill would “also, and necessarily, modif[y] the prior art sections 
of the patent law . . . and the phrase ‘available to the public’ is added to clarify 
the broad scope of relevant prior art, as well as to emphasize the fact that it 
must be publicly available.” Id. at 466. 
 179. Id. 472–73 (citing 157 CONG. REC. S5319–21 (daily ed. Sept. 6, 2011)). 
“Public uses and sales of an invention will remain prior art, but only if they 
make the invention available to the public. An inventor’s confidential sale of his 
invention, his demonstration of its use to a private group, or a third party’s 
unrestricted but private use of the invention will no longer constitute [prior] 
art.” Id. As to litigation cost, “[u]nder current law, depositions and litigation 
discovery are required in order to identify all of the inventor’s private dealings 
with third parties and determine whether those dealings constitute a secret 
offer for sale or third party use that invalidates the patent under the current 
law’s forfeiture doctrine. The need for such discovery is eliminated once the 
definition of ‘prior art’ is limited to those activities that make the [invention] 
accessible to the public. This will greatly reduce the time and cost of patent 
litigation and allow the courts and the [USPTO] to operate much more 
efficiently.” Id., 
 180. See id. 473–75. 
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Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Reimerdes; and Williamson v. 
Southern Regional Council, Inc.—holding that when the words 
‘or otherwise’ or ‘or other’ are used to add a modifier at the end 
of a string of clauses, the modifier thus added restricts the 
meaning of the preceding clauses”; “(7) stated that new § 102(a) 
would ‘limit[] and reconcile[] the various purposes that have 
been ascribed to § 102’s definition of prior art, ‘and in particular 
eliminate []encouragement of prompt filing and limits on 
commercialization of an invention as purposes that are served 
by the definition of ‘prior art’.”181 
The Federal Circuit ignored the legislative history 
supportive of Helsinn’s interpretation and stated that floor 
statements are typically not reliable as indicators of 
congressional intent.182 Additionally, the Federal Circuit 
explained that the precedents in the legislative history cited by 
the parties were restricted to “public use” and since the public 
use issue was not before the court, it would not be addressed by 
the court.183 The court further explained that even if the floor 
statements were intended to overrule the secret or confidential 
sale cases, that would not affect the result because “those cases 
were concerned entirely with whether the existence of a sale or 
offer was public” and there was no doubt about the existence of 
the supply and purchase agreement between Helsinn and 
MGI.184 Further, Federal Circuit expressed its concern that 
Helsinn’s interpretation would “work a foundational change in 
the theory of the statutory on-sale bar.”185 The court cited 
numerous cases to suggest that there was an established rule of 
on-sale bar and there was no indication in the floor statements 
that the Congress intended to overrule all the cases.186 The court 
                                                        
 181. See id. 468–70. The Guide further noted that the final Committee 
Report also include, among other things, “(9) noted that new § 102(a)(1) would 
abrogate Egbert v. Lippman, the infamous ‘corset clasp’ case; and (10) argued 
that preservation of the secret-sale-and-use forfeiture doctrines would be ‘fairly 
disastrous for the U.S. patent system,’ because it would render post-grant 
review unmanageable and, in combination with the elimination of the 
geographic restrictions on prior art, enable foreign theft of U.S. inventions.” Id. 
at 470. 
 182. See Helsinn Healthcare S.A. v. Teva Pharm. USA, Inc., 855 F.3d 1356, 
1368 (Fed. Cir. 2017), cert. granted, 138 S. Ct. 2678 (2018). 
 183. See id. at 1368–69. 
 184. Id. at 1369. 
 185. Id. 
 186. See id. at 1371. The Federal Circuit explained that the meaning of 
“available to the public” is that “the public sale itself would put the patented 
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concluded that no floor statement suggested that the sale or the 
offer must themselves publicly disclosing the details of the 
invention, and if Congress intended to make such “a sweeping 
change,” it would do so with a clear language.187 
The Federal Circuit likely erred in concluding that the 
precedent was only concerned with “public use.” As mentioned 
above, private or secret sale has been mentioned more than once 
in numerous floor statements and committee reports, not only 
limited to “public use.” Specifically, the precedent cited in the 
legislative history was for the purpose of clarifying how courts 
should proceed with the new public availability standard, which 
should be based on the “public accessibility” established by the 
cited “public use” precedents. Nevertheless, the Federal Circuit 
was likely right in its decision to decline considering the 
legislative history. Legislative history can be easily manipulated 
by parties to support their positions. For example, Teva also 
cited numerous drafting history documents of the AIA to show 
that Congress intended to preserve the on-sale bar’s meaning.188 
Arguing that Helsinn’s sources were a post hoc concoction of a 
statement made after the speaker had failed to change the 
statutory text, Teva cited sources to suggest that Senator Kyl 
was aware of the meaning of on-sale bar and tried to change the 
text to repeal that term in the new statute.189 Only after he failed 
to change the text, he attempted to accomplish his goal through 
the Congressional Record.190 As pointed out by one Amicus brief, 
the floor statement of members of Congress merely reflects their 
“personal intent, unexpressed in the statute, to overrule existing 
law” and should not be used to “change settled law.”191 
With so many controversies and disputes regarding how the 
legislative history of the AIA affect the interpretation of the on-
sale bar under the AIA, like the Federal Circuit, the Supreme 
Court chose not to discuss it at all. The Supreme Court seemed 
                                                        
product in the hands of the public.” Id. Further, the court stated that Senator 
Kyl himself agreed with such proposition because he said “once a product is sold 
on the market, any invention that is inherent to the product becomes publicly 
available prior art and cannot be patented.” Id. (citing 157 Cong. Rec. 3423 
(2011) (remarks of Sen. Kyl)). 
 187. See id. 
 188. See Brief for Respondents, supra note 86, at 39. 
 189. See id. 39–40. 
 190. See id. at 40. 
 191. Brief for 45 Intellectual Property Professors as Amicus Curiae 
Supporting Respondent, supra note 101, at 8–9. 
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to agree with the Federal Circuit that legislative history was not 
reliable and thus carried little weigh in statutory interpretation. 
Considering the complexity and manipulability of various 
sources of legislative history, the Supreme Court might be 
justified to choose to ignore the legislative history arguments 
from both sides. 
iii. The Supreme Court Should Discuss Other Underlying 
Polices Besides the Weight of Precedents 
Although the Supreme Court considered the importance of 
precedents in reaching its decision, it did not discuss other 
important polices such as the main purpose of the enactment of 
the AIA. However, as mentioned earlier, the Supreme Court may 
purposely avoid such discussion to keep the opinion short.192 
First, as pointed out by Helsinn, the move from a first-to-
invent system to a first-inventor-to-file system obviates the need 
for a forfeiture doctrine since an inventor who delays filing 
patent application runs the risk of losing his right to another 
who files or discloses first.193 A confidential agreement could not 
guarantee that the invention would not be disclosed by others.194 
In fact, the more agreements one enters into, there are more 
risks of disclosing the invention to the public.195 In other words, 
the “public availability” standard may effectively rein in the 
potential abuse of the system. Further, since no countries in the 
world besides the United States. has the concept of an on-sale 
bar, Helsinn’s interpretation of the new § 102(a)(1) would better 
serve Congress’s goal of harmonizing United States patent law 
with other foreign patent systems and would foster innovation 
by affording small companies flexibility to form partnerships to 
develop inventions.196 However, the United States patent system 
is not the exact same as the rest of the world. For example, the 
grace period in United States. is one year before the official filing 
date, while other foreign patent systems, which are all strict 
“first-to-file” systems, do not generally have friendly grace 
                                                        
 192. See Mann, supra note 146. 
 193. See Michael Pomianek & Michelle Nyein, A Firsthand Account of the 
Helsinn v. Teva Arguments, LAW360 (Dec. 7, 2018), https://www-law360-
com.ezproxy.law.umn.edu/articles/1108997/a-firsthand-account-of-the-helsinn-
v-teva-arguments. 
 194. Id. 
 195. Id. 
 196. See id. 
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periods.197 Most of the foreign patent systems do not have a grace 
period or put too many restrictions on the grace period.198 The 
one-year grace period in the United States patent system is 
much broader, both in scope and duration, as compared with 
other patent systems.199 Therefore, the United States. grace 
period gives inventors enough time to seek business partners 
and financial support before deciding to file a patent application. 
It is the inventor’s responsibility to not miss the one-year 
deadline. 
Another policy concern is the overlap between the on-sale 
bar cases and the “public use” cases. Under the pre-AIA § 102, a 
prior use must be a public use in order to invalidate a patent.200 
This serves better on the policy that a patent is a tradeoff 
between the inventor and the society. As explained by Justice 
Thomas in the Supreme Court’s opinion,201 the purpose of the 
statutory bar is to prevent taking back something that is already 
in the public domain. If the use is “in private,” there is nothing 
in the public domain. The “on sale” bar may be used in a similar 
way. 
Teva was worried that allowing secret sale would encourage 
inventors to unjustifiably extend the patent term by delaying 
filing applications. The “public use” bar would arguably 
encounter the same risk. An inventor would have the incentive 
to delay the filing and use their invention in private for patent 
term extension. Under the pre-AIA § 102, an inventor can 
maintain a use as “private” as long as they exercise enough 
“control” over the invention, for example, by providing 
confidentiality agreements.202 Further, the switch from “first-to-
                                                        
 197. See PAUL GOLDSTEIN & MARKETA TRIMBLE, INTERNATIONAL 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW CASES AND MATERIALS 466 (4th ed. 2015). 
 198. Id. 
 199. Id. 
 200. See AIR-vend, Inc. v. Thorne Industries, Inc., 625 F. Supp. 1123, 1131 
(D. Minn. 1985), aff’d, 831 F.2d 306 (Fed. Cir. 1987). See also Delano Farms Co. 
v. California Table Grape Commn., 778 F.3d 1243, 1247 (Fed. Cir. 2015). 
 201. See Helsinn Healthcare S.A. v. Teva Pharm. USA, Inc.,139 S. Ct. 628, 
632 (2019) (“Congress has imposed several conditions on the ‘limited 
opportunity to obtain a property right in an idea,’ (citation omitted). One such 
condition is the on-sale bar, which reflects Congress’ ‘reluctance to allow an 
inventor to remove existing knowledge from public use’ by obtaining a patent 
covering that knowledge.”). 
 202. See Moleculon Research Corp. v. CBS, Inc., 793 F.2d 1261, 1266 (Fed. 
Cir. 1986) (stating that the presence of a confidentiality agreement is a factor 
to be considered in determining public use). 
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invent” to “first-inventor-to-file” system (or more specifically, 
“first-inventor-to-disclose”) provides additional incentives for 
inventors to file or disclose early. Further, regarding the 
potential abuse of the secret sale to extend the legal monopoly 
term, maybe the main question, as noted by Helsinn, is whether 
the on-sale bar should pursue the purpose to prevent such abuse 
“at all costs,”203 including any benefits that could be conferred to 
small business owners. 
Based on the facts, the published redacted agreement did 
not disclose the critical low dosage that was the invention of 
Helsinn. Using the specific drug to treat the specific disease was 
already well known. The important invention was that the low 
dosage of the drug would still be effective. No one in the public, 
after reading the redacted agreement, would understand what 
the claimed invention in the later-filed application would be. 
Most importantly, the purchaser was obligated to keep the 
information confidential and to prevent it from being in the 
public domain. This is similar to the confidential agreement in 
the “public use” rule. Since there would be no “public 
availability,” such sale should not be considered as prior art just 
like a “private use” would not be considered as prior art. 
However, the Supreme Court disagreed. Although the 
opinion did not discuss when the invention becomes “public,” it 
is likely that the Court was influenced by the argument of 
amicus curiae United States during the oral hearing regarding 
when a product became “on sale” and decided that when the 
product is in the hands of a distributor (here, MGI), the product 
would be deemed as “on sale.”204 Teva further noted that a sale 
to a distributor put the product on sale and the existence of a 
confidential agreement was irrelevant to whether an invention 
was in public.205 
                                                        
 203. See Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 114, at 18. 
 204. See id. 22–23 (Speaking as to what constitutes a sale, Justice 
Sotomayor said “But if you ask in the industry to distributors, they’ll say the 
moment that Apple was going to start shipping it to distributors.”). 
 205. See Brief for Respondents, supra note 86, at 54-58. (“A single 
commercial sale has always sufficed to trigger the bar, no matter who buys the 
invention or what the buyer does with it . . . It follows that a single sale is no 
less invalidating even if the buyer signs a non-disclosure agreement.”); Id. at 
55. (“Notably, the government does not argue that the existence of a non-
disclosure agreement, or the number of sales, is relevant to whether an 
invention is ‘available to the public.”). 
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One of the precedents that influence the Supreme Court’s 
decision is likely the Metallizing case where Judge Hand hold 
that a commercial use of an invention constitutes a “public use” 
under the pre-AIA § 102(b), even if the use was done in secret.206 
In reaching the holding, Justice Hand had to read “public” to 
mean “secret” in order to modify “use.”207 The major reason for 
such reading is to prevent the inventor to unlimitedly extend the 
period of his monopoly.208 During the oral hearing, Justice 
Kavanaugh and Justice Breyer both hinted at the policy 
consideration raised in Metallizing.209 Even Helsinn conceded 
that a commercial exploitation should prevent an inventor from 
filing an application after the critical date.210 However, Helsinn 
argued that Justice Hand did not mean that every pre-patent 
commercialization should trigger the on-sale bar.211 That 
argument obviously did not convince the Supreme Court. 
Although the Supreme Court did not discuss the Metallizing 
case in its opinion, it emphasized the underlying policy that the 
patent system should both promote innovation and prevent 
monopolies.212 The Supreme Court reached the correct 
conclusion given the weight of the 200-year settled law as well 
as the important underlying policy. If the AIA was intended to 
change the old meaning of the on-sale bar by requiring “public 
availability,” not only would it overrule all the judicial 
precedents overnight, it would also encourage inventors to 
conceal their inventions for secret commercial exploitation and 
thus extend their monopolies, which would defeat the exact 
purpose of having a patent system. 
                                                        
 206. See generally Metallizing Engr. Co. v. Kenyon Bearing & Auto Parts 
Co., 153 F.2d 516 (2d Cir. 1946). 
 207. See id. at 520. 
 208. See id. (“[F]or he is not then making use of his secret to gain a 
competitive advantage over others; he does not thereby extend the period of his 
monopoly.”). 
 209. See Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 114, 8-9. 
 210. See id. 9-10. 
 211. See id. at 10. (“But I don’t think it’s fair to say that what Judge Hand 
was doing was saying that the on-sale bar reaches all forms of pre-patent 
commercialization. I think that is an over-reading of the on-sale bar.”). 
 212. See Helsinn Healthcare S.A. v. Teva Pharm. USA, Inc.,139 S. Ct. 628, 
632 (2019) (“To further the goal of ‘motivating innovation and enlightenment’ 
while also ‘avoiding monopolies that unnecessarily stifle competition . . . .”). 
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B. RECOMMENDATIONS TO INVENTORS NOW: BUSINESS 
STRATEGIES AND PATENT FILING PRACTICES 
Although the Helsinn decision is correct in prohibiting 
secret commercial exploitation, the decision will undoubtedly 
have a significant impact on the consequences of engaging in 
commercial transactions before filing patent applications, 
especially for small and midsize pharmaceutical and biotech 
companies, which often rely on early-stage development 
partnerships to defray the costs and risks of new drug 
development.213 Without the flexibility of entering contracts 
with partners, these companies would unable to obtain sufficient 
funding to advance products through R&D or clinical trials, just 
like Helsinn.214 
However, there are a few steps that inventors could and 
should take to safeguard their confidential commercial activities 
from becoming patent-defeating prior art after the Supreme 
Court’s final decision in Helsinn. It is noted that the Court 
reaffirmed the Pfaff decision. In other words, notwithstanding 
that Pfaff was a pre-AIA decision, Pfaff’s two-step framework for 
on-sale bar is still valid after Helsinn.215 The first step in Pfaff is 
whether there is a commercial offer for sale and it is analyzed 
under commercial contract law principles.216 Precautions under 
this step that an inventor can take include (1) not reducing an 
exchange to writing; (2) qualifying discussions as providing only 
general estimates; (3) declaring the terms discussed are merely 
preliminary which require managerial approval in order to bind 
parties in transaction; and (4) “renting out” rather than selling 
the invention so that the title remains in the inventor.217 As to 
the second step, an inventor should file a patent application as 
soon as the invention is “ready for patenting.”218 These 
precautions, although not necessarily foolproof, may help reduce 
                                                        
 213. See Pomianek & Nyein, supra note 193. 
 214. See id. (“Other common prefiling sale activities include manufacturing 
or engineering services contracts that involve payment for resulting products.”). 
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the likelihood of on-sale bar.219 In addition, patent attorneys, 
especially in-house patent attorneys, should pay close attention 
to what their commercial team is doing and monitor the 
interactions among different departments to avoid the problem 
that Helsinn encountered.220 Further, because the USPTO has 
already relied on its own interpretation of the on-sale bar under 
the AIA for many years (which now is overruled by the Supreme 
Court decision), it would be prudent for patent attorneys to 
examine and update the existing patent portfolios to prevent any 
surprise regarding the on-sale bar in future litigations. 
CONCLUSION 
The Supreme Court’s decision of Helsinn is likely correct 
even though its opinion did not discuss many aspects that might 
be relevant to its decision, including the statutory interpretation 
of the AIA § 102(a)(1), the relevant legislative history, and the 
underlying polices relating to the AIA and the on-sale bar. 
Nevertheless, given the weight of the pre-AIA precedents, the 
Supreme Court is correct in its decision. 
                                                        
 219. See id. 
 220. Matthew Bultman, “On Sale” Ruling Shows Need for Earlier Patent 
Applications, LAW360 (Jan. 22, 2019, 9:07 PM EST), 
https://www.law360.com/articles/1120924/-on-sale-ruling-shows-need-for-
earlier-patent-applications. 
